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CORPORATE INTERDEPENDENCE: THE DEBT AND EQUITY
FINANCING OF JAPANESE COMPANIES
MELISSA J. KRASNOW*
I. INTRODUCTION
Corporate interdependence ... is the fabric of industrial Japan and is
manifest in the constant interaction between government authorities and
business organizations, among companies, and within companies them-
selves. 1
The interdependence between the actors in the Japanese corporate system
is important in the financing of Japanese companies. 2 When Japanese
companies need to obtain capital, these companies work together with other
Japanese companies, with Japanese banks, and with the Japanese government
in securing financing. Corporate interdependence is reflected in the financial
relationships among Japanese companies, between Japanese companies and
Japanese banks which are members of business groups, and between
members of the business groups and the Japanese government.
The goal of this article is to show how Japanese companies are financed
with debt and equity and how corporate interdependence facilitates the
financing process. In order to discuss the context in which the financing
process developed, Section II of this article describes the legal and political
evolution of Japanese business groups during the twentieth century. Section
III discusses how Japanese companies are financed with debt domestically,
with emphasis on bank loans. Loans from Japanese banks to companies in the
business groups, which are covered by loans from the Japanese government,
illustrate the interdependence within business groups and between business
groups and the government. Section IV explores the equity financing of
Japanese companies, including the issuance of stock by Japanese companies
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1. ROBERT BALLON & IWAO TOMITA, THE FINANCIAL BEHAVIOR OF JAPANESE CORPORA-
TIONS 3 (1988).
2. "Japanese companies" will be used in article to refer only to kabushiki kaisha, which are
comparable to typical public U.S. corporations. This article focuses on Japanese companies,
which the Japanese Commercial Code provides for in Chapter IV of Book II. In addition to
Japanese companies, Book II of the Japanese Commercial Code describes provisions for different
types of Japanese partnerships-commercial partnerships (gomei kaisha) and limited partnerships
(goshi kaisha) which will not be discussed in this article. Shoho, [The Commercial Code of
Japan], No. 48, March 9, 1899 translated in 2 EIBUN HOREI SHA, E.H.S. LAW BULLETIN
SERIES, JA as amended [hereinafter COMMERCIAL CODE, 2 EHSJA].
1
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and the ownership of these shares. Reciprocal ownership of shares between
Japanese companies, a significant source of equity finance, reflects the
interdependence among companies.
II. EVOLUTION OF JAPANESE BUSINESS GROUPS, 1899-1990
This section traces the legal and political evolution of business groups in
Japan, from the legal beginning of the Japanese company at the beginning of
this century to the present industrial groupings of Japanese companies.
Tracing this evolution encompasses the growth of the Japanese economy and
the recent restructuring of industry, financial liberalization, internationaliza-
tion, and decline in Tokyo Stock Exchange share prices.
A. The Zaibatsu, 1899-1945
The Japanese Commercial Code, enacted in 1899, legally defined the
Japanese version of Western stock companies (kabushiki kaisha).3 When
combined into a single business group, these Japanese companies were
known collectively as zaibatsu. "Zaibatsu" specifically refers to the large,
oligopolistic business groups encompassing banks and insurance, manufactur-
ing, and trading companies which dominated the Japanese economy until the
end of World War 11.
4
The zaibatsu were hierarchical groups which depended on the many
vertical and horizontal linkages between component companies for their
structure.5 Zaibatsu structural linkages consisted of a wealthy family
controlling the top holding company (honsha), which controlled the principal
operating subsidiaries of the top holding company.' The principal operating
subsidiaries of the top holding company, in turn, controlled other companies
through interlocking directorates or shareholdings.'
Other linkages within the zaibatsu included the shipping and financial
institutions providing capital to the operating companies; the manufacturing
companies trading among themselves; and the trading companies procuring
raw materials for the manufacturing companies and selling the goods
3. The original Japanese Commercial Code was based mainly on the German code. THOMAS
A. BISSON, ZAIBATSU DISSOLUTION IN JAPAN 29 (1954). The present Japanese Commercial
Code was heavily influenced by U.S. corporation law, which was introduced during the Allied
Occupation after World War II. BALLON & TOMITA, supra note 1, at 9.
4. RICHARD E. CAVES & MASU UEKUSA, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION IN JAPAN 60 (1976);
See infra note 11.
5. These characteristics of hierarchy, status, and group cooperation reflect the Japanese ideal
of oyabun-kobun, the relationship between a leader and followers (e.g., a lord-to-vassals
relationship). BISSON, supra note 3, at 32.
6. "Top holding company" will be in this article to refer to the honsha.
7. CAVES & UEKUSA, supra note 4. That these principal operating subsidiaries of the top
holding company controlled other subsidiaries and therefore were holding companies had
consequences for dissolution after World War II. To have adequate dissolution, the dissolution
proceedings needed to extend to these top subsidiaries. BISSON, supra note 3, at 25.
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produced by them on a global basis. The most important external linkages
were the close links between the zaibatsu and the Japanese government.' The
Japanese government enacted laws and employed "administrative guidance"
(gyosei shido) to direct the zaibatsu in addition to giving them preferential
economic treatment.' For example, the Japanese government designated
certain companies as "national policy" or "special" (e.g., the Bank of Japan)
and helped to vest them with capital.' 0
B. Postwar Dissolution of the Zaibatsu, 1945-1952
Through World War II, the overall growth of the Japanese economy was
due in large part to the zaibatsu, which dominated the economy." Howev-
er, after Japan's defeat by the Allied Powers in World War II, industrial
production was curtailed drastically by the destruction of most of Japan's
industrial base. After the war, the U.S. sought to democratize the Japanese
economy and eliminate the great concentration of economic power therein by
dissolving the zaibatsu.
In theory, dissolution was to entail the relinquishing of securities and the
liquidating of assets held by the zaibatsu.2 However, while 257 industrial
firms and 68 distribution firms were targeted for reorganization initially, only
18 of these firms actually were subject to any dissolution action. 13 One
example of such action was the dissolving of all the holding companies of the
four leading zaibatsu-Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Sumitomo, and Yasuda. The
control exercised by wealthy families over these zaibatsu ceased because their
share and equity holdings in the holding companies were eliminated. In
addition, certain financial linkages and shareholding linkages between
8. These links were both political and personal. As for political links, many representatives
of the zaibatsu occupied positions in the upper echelons of the Japanese government (e.g.,
zaibatsu executives in the Ministry of Finance). As for personal links, there were marriages
involving the families of top zaibatsu executives and top government officials (e.g., the marriage
between a Mitsubishi executive's son and the daughter of a Ministry of Finance official).
9. Id. at 13. Administrative guidance (gyosei shido) refers to actions by the Japanese
government which are neither based on explicit law nor illegal. Such actions include the issuance
of directives, requests, warnings, suggestions, and encouragements to business groups under thejurisdiction of a given ministry. Though administrative guidance was not discussed publicly until
the 1960s, the Japanese government was employing it to handle the zaibatsu during the 1930s.
JOHNSON, MITI AND THE JAPANESE MIRACLE 110, 265-66 (1982).
10. See supra note 8. The Japanese government gave subsidies to the zaibatsu in order to
spur industrialization and economic development.
11. Laws promulgated during the 1930s to promote military buildup further concentrated
economic power in the zaibatsu. HIROSHI ODA & R. GEOFFREY GRICE, JAPANESE BANKING,
SECURITIES AND ANTI-MONOPOLY LAW 113 (1988). In addition, the zaibatsu worked with the
Japanese government to run the wartime economy. At the end of World War II, the four leading
zaibatsu-Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Sumitomo, and Yasuda-controlled approximately 25 percent of
the paid-in capital of businesses incorporated in Japan. CAVES & UEKUSA, supra note 4, at 86.
12. T.F.M. ADAMS & IWAO HOSHII, A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE NEW JAPAN 23 (1972).
13. CAVES & UEKUSA, supra note 4, at 62.
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zaibatsu companies were eliminated. 4
In order to prevent the reemergence of a similar concentration of
economic power, the Antimonopoly Law was passed in 1947.11 This law,
influenced largely by U.S. antitrust law, aims to promote and maintain free
and fair competition and trade in the marketplace. To achieve this goal, the
Antimonopoly Law covers private monopolization, unreasonable restrictions
on trade, and unfair methods of trading. The Fair Trade Commission (FTC),
an agency connected with the Prime Minister's office, is responsible for
implementing this law.
C. Emergence of the Keiretsu, 1952-1957
In spite of the Antimonopoly Law and the FTC, economic power
remains concentrated among large interdependent groupings known as sogo
shosha and keiretsu. After the Allied Occupation of Japan ended in 1952,
some of the former zaibatsu trading companies started to rebuild themselves
without the top holding companies. The trading companies which emerged
from this rebuilding are referred to as the sogo shosha.16 In addition, the
sogo shosha extended their reach to exercise "quasi-control" over small and
medium-sized companies by offering them assistance in finance and
management. 7 The sogo shosha have multiple functions, including procur-
ing equipment, technology, and raw material, financing trade transactions,
and exporting. One of the most distinctive and important characteristics of
the sogo shosha is that they have a global network of offices and trading
contacts which make them essential players in transactions with outside
business entities. I The six largest sogo shosha include Mitsubishi Corpora-
tion, Mitsui & Company, Sumitomo Corporation, Marubeni Corporation, C.
Itoh & Company, and Nissho-Iwai.19
Furthermore, industrial groups known as keiretsu developed around the
nucleus of a sogo shosha and a principal bank.' The six major keiretsu
(with sogo shosha and principal bank listed in parentheses) are the Mitsubishi
(Mitsubishi Corporation and Mitsubishi Bank), Mitsui (Mitsui & Company
and Sakura Bank, formerly Mitsui Taiyo Kobe Bank), Sumitomo (Sumitomo
Corporation and Sumitomo Bank), Fuyo (Marubeni Corporation and Fuji
Bank), Dai-Ichi Kangyo (C. Itoh & Company and Dai-Ichi Kangyo Bank),
14. Id. at 63-64.
15. The Antimonopoly Law has since been amended twice-in 1953 and in 1977.
Antimonopoly Law, Law No. 54, July 20, 1947, as amended [hereinafter Antimonopoly Law].
16. The organizational roots of the sogo shosha can be traced back to the diversified trading
companies of the nineteenth century (e.g., Mitsui Bussan). Because the predominant English
translation of sogo shosha as being a comprehensive trading firm fails to describe its many
functions, the Japanese term sogo shosha instead will be used throughout this article.
17. M.Y, YOSHINO & THOMAS B. LIFSON, THE INVISIBLE LINK 29 (1986).
18. Id. at 22, 28, 244, 261.
19. Id. at 2-3.
20. CLYDE PRESTOWITZ, TRADING PLACES 157 (1988).
[Vol. 24
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and Sanwa (Nissho-Iwai and Sanwa Bank) groups.2 Each keiretsu also
encompasses a variety of service and manufacturing firms. Service firms
generally comprise insurance and shipping companies, while manufacturing
firms include steel, chemical, petroleum, electrical, machinery, mining, and
construction companies.'
The keiretsu retain such important internal linkages as business
reciprocity among member companies, financial linkages, interlocking
directorates, and cross-shareholdings. 3 While the keiretsu lack the "tight
discipline and strict central coordination" and "degree of power and control
in the Japanese economy" of the prewar zaibatsu, they still represent a
significant concentration of economic power among larger business
groups u
Despite the concentration of economic power and the extent of coopera-
tion within a keiretsu, competition among the keiretsu has been fierce. After
World War II, tremendous opportunities for growth existed. As a result, the
keiretsu actively pursued growth and diversification under the "one-set"
policy of building a group of diversified commercial and industrial operations
while excluding competitors from this group.'
D. Recovery and Growth of the Economy, 1950-early 1970s
Economic recovery began in 1950s. In 1950, the Korean War and the
subsequent U.S. demand for military goods and services increased Japanese
exports, thereby stimulating the economy. Furthermore, during the 1950s,
the Japanese government promoted the development of such capital-intensive
heavy industries as steel, chemicals, petroleum, and machinery by providing
26them with protection and incentives.
21. Id.; Brian W. Semkow, Japanese Banking Law: Current Deregulation and Liberalization
of Domestic and External Financial Transactions, 17 LAW & POL'Y IN INT'L Bus. 99 n.151(1985); STEPHEN BRONTE, JAPANESE FINANCE: MARKETS AND INSTITUTIONS 252-57 (1982).
Mitsui Taiyo Kobe Bank changed its name to Sakura Bank on April 1, 1992. T.R. Reid, In
Japan, Banking on a New Image, WASH. POST, Apr. 2, 1992, at B10.
22. W. CARL KETER, JAPANESE TAKEOVERS 54-56 (1991).
23. Through these internal linkages, companies within a keiretsu help each other. For
example, through business reciprocity and financial linkages, these companies transact business
with each other regularly and provide financing for other companies, especially those in financial
trouble. Id. at 53, 70-71. Interlocking directorates will be discussed in Section 1II. See infra note
65. Cross-shareholding will be defined in Section IV.
24. YOSHINO & LIFSON, supra note 17, at 31.
25. Id. at 33; BALLON & TOMITA, supra note 1 at 9, 58.
26. In particular, the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), which devises and
implements Japanese industrial and trade policies, oversaw the economic recovery and growth
of postwar Japan. YOSHI TSURUMI, JAPANESE BUSINESS 63 (1978). MITI's goals for economic
development during the 1950s and 1960s included encouraging the channeling of resources
toward specific favored industries and promoting larger business groups in certain industries to
achieve economies of scale.
One way that the target industries have pursued these goals is through mergers in which
5
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Active government promotion resulted in tremendous capital investment
in these industries. During the period between 1952 and 1973, Japanese
industries periodically absorbed large amounts of capital, resulting in average
annual increases in real gross domestic investment of 13 percent.27 Most of
this investment capital was provided by commercial banks, which, in turn,
relied on the Bank of Japan (BOJ) for loans.28 To a lesser extent, issues of
new stock and bonds during the early 1950s helped to raise capital for
Japanese industries.29 By the mid-1950s, Japan's economic recovery was
complete, since output in all major industries except mining was much
greater than before World War 11.30
During the 1950s and 1960s, the Japanese government adopted the policy
goal of liberalizing foreign trade and capital transfers. 3' These measures led
to the dramatic acceleration of Japan's export growth during the 1960s:
Japanese exports quadrupled, increasing at twice the rate of world trade as
a whole. 32 As a result, at the beginning of the 1970s, Japan had a substan-
tial trading surplus and had one of the strongest currencies in the world.
E. Industrial Restructuring and Internationalization, 1970s
The 1970s were characterized by the restructuring of Japanese industry,
one company absorbs another. According to Japan's Federal Trade Commission (FTC), mergers
decrease domestic competition between business groups so that they can better compete against
foreign business groups. CAVES & UEKUSA, supra note 4, at 29, 149. Competition against
foreign business entities became increasingly important as restrictions on foreign business in
Japan were being relaxed during the 1960s and early 1970s. PAUL NOR1URY & GEOFFREY
BOWNAS, BUSINESS IN JAPAN 39 (1974).
27. YOSHINO & LIFSON, supra note 17, at 25. As a result of this tremendous capital
investment, Japan's gross national product (GNP) rose, on average, 10.5 percent between 1950
to 1973. Alan S. Gutterman, Japan and Korea: Contrasts and Comparisons in Regulatory
Policies of Cooperative Growth Economies, 8 INT'L TAX & Bus. LAW. 267 (1990).
28. 80 percent of new capital was provided by commercial banks. GEORGE ALLEN, A SHORT
ECONOMIC HISTORY OF MODERN JAPAN 191 (1972); BRONTE, supra note 21, at 143.
29. As for the issues of new stock, the Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE) reopened in 1949.
Japanese industries applied the funds gained from the issuance of new stock towards equipment,
working capital, and the repayment of loans. ADAMS & HOSHII, supra note 12, at 71-72.
30. YOSHINO & LIFSON, supra note 17, at 25.
31. ADAMS & HOSHII, supra note 12, at 249. Japan took the following steps to implement
this policy goal. In 1952, Japan joined the International Monetary Fund (IMF). In 1955, Japan
joined the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). In 1959, IMF and GATT
demanded that Japan have freely convertible currency and open its domestic market to foreign
goods. In 1960, the Japanese government responded to these demands by adopting the "Plan for
the Liberalization of Trade and Exchange." This plan laid the basis for the revised Foreign
Exchange Law, which was enacted by the Diet in 1979. JOHNSON, supra note 9, at 220, 238;
See infra note 36. In 1964, Japan became a member of the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD). The OECD is composed of advanced industrialized
nations "committed to not only trade liberalization but also to the removal of controls on capital
transactions." JOHNSON, supra note 9, at 263. The IMF, GATT, and OECD all were established
to advance the doctrine of free trade. PRESTOWITZ, supra note 20, at 230.
32. ALLEN, supra note 28, at 182, 201. The majority of these exports were products of
heavy industry, which was dominated by the keiretsu. YOSHINO & LIFSON, supra note 17, at
28.
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slower economic growth, and internationalization through the easing of
restraints on foreign capital and investment. By the mid-1970s, annual
economic growth in Japan slowed to 3 to 5 percent as a result of the
recessions caused by two "oil shocks." 33 In 1974, the Ministry of Interna-
tional Trade and Industry (MITI) responded to this slowdown with the
publication of its initial "long-term vision" of the restructuring of Japanese
industry from capital-intensive heavy industries to knowledge-intensive
industries. 3
In addition, MITI's vision called for Japan to "internationalize" for its
own sake. 35 This call for "internationalization" (kokusaika) was in response
to new economic competition from such newly industrialized countries
(NICs) as South Korea and laid the basis for financial liberalization in the
1980s. The most significant sign of internationalization was the Diet's
enactment in 1979 of the revised Foreign Exchange Law. The Foreign
Exchange Law promotes free foreign exchange and investment transactions
and capital flows into and out of Japan and mandates government control
over these transactions only in exceptional situations.36
F. Financial Liberalization and Internationalization, 1980s
Despite the slower annual economic growth during the 1970s, the
Japanese economy finally caught up with the leading Western economies at
the beginning of the 1980s. By 1980, Japan's per capita gross national
product (GNP) was equivalent to that of other advanced industrial democra-
cies (e.g., the United States and Germany).37 By 1987, Japan's per capita
GNP exceeded that of the United States.38
During the .1980s, the Japanese government continued to emphasize the
development of knowledge-intensive industries and internationalization
through the easing of restraints on foreign capital and exchange. The revised
Foreign Exchange Law went into effect in 1980. In addition, the Japanese
government began to emphasize the policy goal of financial liberalization by
33. ODA & GRICE, supra note 11, at 4. "Oil shocks" refers to the sudden increases in
energy costs in Japan. There increases were due to the decreased supply of oil available in the
world market associated with the wars in the Middle East. JOHNSON, supra note 9, at 297.
34. JOHNSON, supra note 9, at 301. Examples of knowledge-intensive industries include
high-technology, computers, and other industries with high value-added potential. MITSUO
MATSUSHITA & THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, JAPANESE INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INVESTMENT
LAW 27 (1989).
35. JOHNSON, supra note 9, at 301.
36. This revised law amalgamated and superseded the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade
Law of 1949 and the Law Concerning Foreign Investment of 1950, both of which prohibited,
with few exceptions, free foreign exchange and investment transactions and capital flows into
and out of Japan. BRONTE, supra note 21, at 226.
37. JOHNSON, supra note 9, at 304.
38. Gutterman, supra note 27, at 268.
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taking steps to deregulate financial markets and to internationalize the yen.39
As a result of these measures, capital transactions into and out of Japan
increased dramatically during the decade.'
Three steps in the 1984 Yen-Dollar Accord furthered financial liberaliza-
tion-domestic interest rate deregulation, Euro-yen market deregulation, and
yen internationalization. 41 The Yen-Dollar Accord, reached between Japan
and the United States, promoted "'open and liberalized capital markets and
free movement of capital. "42
First, Japan agreed to deregulate interest rates domestically. The Bank
of Japan deregulated the interest rate ceiling on large denomination deposits
in 1985. By 1987, the minimum large denomination deposit amount
exempted from interest rate regulations had been reduced from Y1 billion to
1100 million.43 Prior to this deregulation, the Ministry of Finance kept
domestic interest rates artificially low, which made the cost of raising capital
relatively inexpensive for Japanese banks. 44 This is significant because
Japanese bank loans account for the largest percentage of working and
investment capital to Japanese companies. 4' One effect of interest rate
deregulation, the increased cost of raising capital, caused stock prices to
decline.'
Second, Japan agreed to deregulate Euro-yen transactions to a great
extent. Specific deregulation measures included permitting both Japanese and
non-Japanese banks to make Euro-yen loans to non-Japanese borrowers
without restrictions and allowing both Japanese and non-Japanese companies
to issue Euro-yen bonds.47 Such deregulation spurred growth in the Euro-
yen market.
Third, Japan agreed to internationalize the yen. The growth in the Euro-
39. KAREL VAN WOLFEREN, THE ENIGMA OF JAPANESE POWER 401 (1989). The aim of
financial market deregulation was to transform Japan into an important global financial power
by increasing the efficiency of Japan's capital markets and opening them to non-Japanese. Harold
Baum, Japanese Capital Markets: New Legislation, 22 LAW IN JAPAN 1 (1989). One
commentator notes: "Japan is thus following the worldwide trend... the so-called globalization
of financial markets, toward commonality in market systems. This by no means signifies that
de facto unification of laws has already been achieved. Yet one can expect that this trend will
continue. . . ." Id. at 25.
40. Baum, supra note 39, at 1, 4; George Tavlas & Yuzue Ozeki, The Internationalization
of the Yen, 28 FIN. & DEV. 2 (June 1991).
41. U.S. -Japan Yen-Dollar Agreement Expected to Strengthen Japan's World Economic Role,
INT'L TRADE REP. 'S U.S. EXPORT WKLY., June 5, 1984 at 1012-13 [hereinafter Yen-Dollar].
"Euro-yen" refers to yen deposited in and managed by banks outside of Japan. Semkow, supra
note 16, at 149.
42. ODA & GRICE, supra note 11, at 3.
43. Id. at 5. Using the recent exchange rate of Y150 to $1, these amounts are equal to
$6,666,666.67 and $666,666.67, respectively.
44. Downbeat: A Survey of Japanese Finance, THE ECONOMIST, Dec. 8, 1990, 60, at 3.
45. BALLON & TOMITA, supra note 1, at 9. For example, in 1981, bank loans constituted
roughly 73 percent of Japanese company financing. Gutterman, supra note 27, at 335 n.242.
46. Downbeat, supra note 44.
47. Yen-Dollar, supra note 41.
[Vol. 24
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yen market, where international transactions are conducted most actively,
reflected the internationalization of the yen during the 1980s. The opening
of the Tokyo offshore market in 1986 also helped to increase international
use of the yen. In this market, non-Japanese are exempt from certain
regulations and taxes as long as they make transactions only with non-
Japanese. As of 1988, the volume of this market was over 120 billion
dollars." However, despite the increased use of the yen in international
transactions, yen internationalization is far from complete: the proportion of
international transactions made in yen is much lower than that of currencies
from such industrialized nations as the United States.49
G. Decline in Tokyo Stock Exchange Share Prices, 1990
The circumstances which led to the steep decline in Tokyo Stock
Exchange (TSE) share prices in 1990 can be traced back to the 1980s. In the
1980s, share prices rose. As Tokyo Stock Exchange share prices rose in the
1980s, assets that Japanese companies held appreciated.5" Japanese compa-
nies borrowed more and more against these rising collateral values in order
to purchase stock in other companies." Japanese banks engaged in profi-
teering by buying and selling stock in Japanese companies as TSE share
prices increased. The stock that banks held appreciated; the banks then used
the increased value of this stock as collateral to lend against.52
The steep decline in Tokyo Stock Exchange share prices resulted from
the "lending spree which created enormous liquidity in terms of money
supply-exceeding by far the amount needed to finance real economic
activity."53 After soaring to an all-time high at the end of 1989, the Nikkei
index of the Tokyo Stock Exchange plunged by 45 percent between February
and October 1990.1
When Tokyo Stock Exchange share prices fell, the value of the
collateral for existing loans was impaired. Moreover, the banks were unable
48. ODA & GRICE, supra note 11, at 10.
49. For example, in the mid-1980s, 72 percent of world reserves were held in dollars
whereas just 4 percent were held in yen. Downbeat, supra note 44. Further internationalization
of the yen will occur when higher proportions of the capital flows into and out of Japan are
made in yen. Tavlas & Ozeki, supra note 40.
50. Anthony Rowley, When the Music Stopped, FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC REVIEW, Dec. 13,
1990, at 43.
51. Id.; Marshall Auerback, Japan Inc. 'sDays Are Nwnbered, WALL ST. J., Sept. 3, 1991,
at A18. This Japanese practice of financial speculation (zai-teku) will be discussed in Section
IV.
52. BALLON & TOMITA, supra note 1, at 141-42; DANIEL BURSTEIN, YEN! 44 (1988);
Rowley, supra note 50.
53. Rowley, supra note 50.
54. Using the recent exchange rate of 1150 to $1, this plunge is equal to $2 billion. See
Downbeat, supra note 44; Rowley, supra note 50.
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to make further loans due to the decreased value of collateral." In addition,
this bank lending situation was aggravated by the increased cost of raising
capital due to higher domestic interest rates. s In this manner, Japanese
banks therefore were adversely affected by the decline in Tokyo Stock
Exchange share prices."
Consequently, a contraction in Japanese bank credit occurred. This credit
crunch was worldwide because Japan was the largest net creditor nation in
the world by 1985.58 In response to the credit contraction, Japanese banks
began to sell their stock in Japanese companies in order to meet Bank for
International Settlements (BIS) capital adequacy standards. 9 In addition,
Japanese companies started to sell stock which they held in Japanese
banks.60
III. DOMESTIC DEBT FINANCE
A. The Position of Banks in the Keiretsu Structure
The prototypical keiretsu structure can be viewed as a concentric
enterprise circle which surrounds a core sogo shosha.6' This circle encom-
passes Japanese companies that traditionally belong to the keiretsu, including
a principal bank. Within this circle, there are financial linkages between the
companies and the principal bank.
The principal bank functions as a source of finance to the companies in
the circle and as a potential check upon the management of these compa-
nies .62 The principal member bank engages in the former function by
providing a high percentage of the capital of the keiretsu and implicitly
55. Auerback, supra note 51.
56. See Downbeat, supra note 44. The higher domestic interest rates resulted from the Bank
of Japan's continual raising of interest rates. Scott Miller, Profits Plunge at Japan's Banks,
AMERICAN BANKER, Nov. 30, 1990, at 1.
57. The Japanese banks also were hurt by problem loans. It was estimated in late 1990 that
problem loans by Japanese banks for U.S. real estate transactions, leveraged buy-outs, and junk
bonds totalled 8 billion dollars. Rowley, supra note 50, at . Profits at major Japanese banks
decreased by more than 25 percent between April and Septem--ber 1990. Id. These problem loans
will be discussed in greater detail in Section III.
58. See Baum, supra note 39. Moreover, the U.S. was unable to help Japan since it also
suffered a credit contraction in 1990. See Downbeat, supra note 44.
59. Since late 1987, Bank for International Settlements (BIS) international capital rules have
required that banks in industrial countries maintain capital equal to at least 8 percent of total
assets by the end of March 1993. See Miller, supra note 56.
60. Inc. 's, supra note 51.
61. This section draws heavily from the following source. NORBURY & BOWNAS, supra note
26, at 62-72.
62. According to the Ministry of Finance (MOF), a Japanese company is a '[subsidiary],
if more than 50% of issued shares is owned by the registrant (parent), or [affiliate], if 20% or
more of issued shares is owned by the registrant and thereby a major part of the business
activities is under his control by uninterrupted and close relationship.' BALLON & TOMITA, supra
note 1, at 39.
[Vol. 24
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insuring against business risk.63 The most important aspect of the principal
member bank's financing function is the favorable treatment accorded to the
Japanese companies within a given keiretsu. This favorable treatment entails
having direct access to a bank of international stature with excellent credit
ratings and being able to obtain loans otherwise not available through a
variety of financing arrangements with that bank.' As for the latter
function, present executives of this bank typically are dispatched to work
with the management of the companies, and former (i.e., retired) executives
often join these companies as presidents and directors to ensure that those in
financial trouble use their capital efficiently.'
B. "Payback Analysis" by Japanese Companies
Japanese companies each have a finance department to work with banks
to obtain working capital. When the need to obtain capital arises, the capital
budgeting analysis which the finance department employs is known as
"payback analysis."' "Payback analysis" involves determining how many
years it will take to pay off with profits the bank's loan at an arbitrarily set
10 percent interest rate.67
C. Debt Finance through Bank Loans
Japanese companies have, on average, a debt-to-equity ratio of 2 to 1;
by contrast, public U.S. corporations have, on average, a debt-to-equity ratio
63. One example of such implicit insurance against business risk is that the principal bank
will step in to restructure Japanese companies within the keirersu that are on the verge of
bankruptcy. J. Mark Ramseyer, Takeovers in Japan: Opportunism, Ideology and Corporate
Control, 35 UCLA L. REV. 1, 31 (1987). The Bank of Japan (BOJ) acts as a guarantor of
principal bank loans to the keiretsu: the BOJ "will assist in a rescue if a large company gets in
trouble". CAVES & UEKUSA, supra note 4, at 39. The Bank of Japan extends to principal banks
large loans to cover the principal bank lending. BRONTE, supra note 21, at 143; BALLON &
TOMITA, supra note 1, at 87.
64. One advantage of principal bank lending within a keiretsu is that there is an implicit
guarantee that other companies in the keiretsu will help to rescue a principal bank in financial
trouble. Keiretsu members mobilize in this manner to provide support for other keiretsu members
only. BALLOON & TOMITA, supra note 1, at 73-74.
It is important to note that a principal bank frequently will engage in lending outside one
keiretsu of which it is a member and possibly be a member of other keiretsu. NORBURY &
BOWNAS, supra note 26, at 62. Through such diversified lending (i.e., lending inside and outside
a given keiretsu), the principal bank spreads the risks of loan defaults among different parties.
CAVES & UEKUSA, supra note 4, at 39.
65. The dispatching of executives from the principal bank to work with the companies is an
example of interlocking directorates. BALLON & TOMITA, supra note 1, at 68.
66. In comparison, the finance departments of U.S. corporations use a battery of
complicated financial techniques such as discounting cash flow and making assumptions about
the rate of return on investment for capital budgeting analysis. RICHARD A. BREALEY &
STEWART C. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 173 (1988); JAMES C. ABEGGLEN
& GERRY STALK, JR., KAISHA, THE JAPANESE CORPORATION 178-79 (1985).
67. ABEGGLEN & STALK, supra note 66, at 178-79.
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of 0.5 to 1.68 Japanese companies tend to be highly leveraged. This
primarily is because obtaining debt financing either through bank loans or
domestic issues of corporate bonds is more convenient and less expensive
than equity financing.69
Japanese companies can be financed with debt in the form of bank loans.
These bank loans comprise the largest percentage of funds that Japanese
companies use to meet working capital and investment needs.7' The loans
and banks are of three main types-long-term loans from long-term credit
banks, short-term loans from commercial banks, and Bank of Japan loans to
commercial banks.
First, there are three long-term credit banks in Japan-the Industrial
Bank of Japan, the Long-Term Credit Bank, and the Nippon Credit Bank.
Long-term credit banks are governed by the Long-Term Credit Bank Law of
1952.11 These banks receive 70 percent of their funds from the issuance of
68. Id. at 150.
The mid-1980s the capital structure of a Japanese company, on average, is shown below:
Liabilities Net Worth
Current liabilities Paid-in capital 6
Accounts payable 18 Capital surplus 4
Short-term borrowing 17 Earned surplus 12
Other 14





BALLON & TOMITA, supra note 1, at 83.
69. This is because interest rates have been kept artificially low, and interest income is taxed
at a lower rate than dividends. Specifically, due to the different tax rates, dividends cost
Japanese companies roughly twice as much as interest. As a result, debt financing has been the
traditional method of financing the industrial sector and the growth thereof in postwar Japan.
Semkow, supra note 21, at 95; BALLON & TOMITA, supra note 1, at 89-90.
70. BALLON & TOMITA, supra note 1, at 87-88; see supra note 45. By the mid-1980s, while
bank loans made to large Japanese companies decreased, bank loans made to small and medium
Japanese companies increased. Large companies accumulated tremendous amounts of surplus
funds (e.g., retained earnings) and turned to alternative sources for financing, particularly the
domestic and international issuance of securities. Semkow, supra note 21, at 95. As large
companies began to utilize these alternative sources of finance, banks increased lending to small
and medium companies. BALLON & TOMITA, supra note 1, at 91.
71. NORBURY & BOWNAS, supra note 26, at 52; ODA & GRICE, supra note 11, at 18.
During the early 1900s, the Japanese government targeted certain sectors of the economy and
created government banks to provide these sectors with long-term financing in order to promote
economic growth. After World War II, the U.S. sought to prevent in postwar Japan the great
concentrations of economic power characteristic of prewar Japan by encouraging Japanese
companies to obtain long-term financing from the capital markets. However, because the
securities markets were neither large enough nor sufficiently developed to provide long-term
financing for many companies, the shift towards the capital markets and away from bank loans
failed to materialize. Long-term credit banks continued to make long-term loans to Japanese
companies. The Long-Term Credit Bank Law, enacted in 1952, recognized formally the existing
situation of long-term finance primarily by long-term credit bank long-term loans. Long-Term
Credit Bank Law, Law No. 187 of 1952. However, this situation appears to be changing
12
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bank bonds and 5 percent from total deposits. 2 Long-term credit banks
provide long-term loans ranging from 5 to 10 years directly to Japanese
companies." 3 These loans often provide funds to Japanese companies in the
industrial sector.74
Second, there are the commercial banks, which are composed of the 11
city banks based in large metropolitan areas and the 64 local banks located
gradually. Short-term loans from commercial banks are continually renewed for long-term
finance. In addition, since the financial liberalization and internationalization of the 1980s,
Japanese companies have been looking more than previously towards domestic and international
capital markets for long-term finance. Semkow, supra note 21, at 107.
72. Semkow, supra note 21, at 102; BALLON & TOMITA, supra note 1, at 87.
73. Such long-term loans constitute approximately 17 percent of the financing of Japanese
companies. BALLON & TOMITA, supra note 1, at 92-93, 102.
74. Semkow, supra note 21, at 102-103. Together, the Ministry of International Trade and
Industry, the Ministry of Finance, the Bank of Japan, and the long-term credit banks influence
the allocation of credit to Japanese companies in certain industries. MITI emphasizes the
development of particular industries (e.g., knowledge-intensive industries) and facilitates this
development. For example, MITI uses administrative guidance to grant tax incentives to the
industries that it targets. Moreover, the long-term credit banks encourage companies in such
industries to borrow funds in order to finance growth. BALLON & TOMITA, supra note 1, at 29.
Ministry of International Trade and Industry officials also influence the industries with which
they have worked closely through amakudari (literally translated as "descent from heaven") by
working in companies in these industries after retiring from MITI. JOHNSON, supra note 9, at301. The Ministry of Finance is one of the most important ministries because of its control over
the Japanese budget. Through its Budget Bureau and Financial Bureau, the Ministry of Finance
controls the three yearly budgets of the Japanese executive branch-the general account, the
special account, and the government investment budgets. Id. at 75; BALLON & TOMITA, supra
note 1, at 33-36. In particular, the Budget Bureau determines the general account budget. The
Budget Bureau receives budget requests from the various government ministries and agencies.
In general, the MOF treats budget requests from the more powerful (i.e., well-connected in
Japanese government and society) ministries such as MITI more favorably than those from other
ministries. BRONTE, supra note 21, at 132. The Trust Fund Bureau of the MOF provides funds
to the industrial sector through the Fiscal Investment and Loan Program (FILP). FILP receives
these funds through postal deposits, pension payments, and insurance premiums. The importance
of such public financial support is that it "primes" private lenders to lend since FILP funds are
directed to sectors of the economy where the return on investment is expected to be high.
BALLON & TOMITA, supra note 1, at 36-37.
In addition, the Banking Bureau of the MOF regulates most Japanese banks, including the
long-term credit banks and the Bank of Japan, by monitoring the funds used by these banks. Id.
at 129. To quote one commentator, '[The function of the Banking Bureau is comparable] to that
of a franchiser. The banks . . . serve as franchisees. . . . The system endures, because the
central motivation is to protect the banks' profits.'" VAN WOLFEREN, supra note 39, at 121.
Furthermore, the MOF influences the long-term credit banks through amakudari: former MOF
officials work for the long-term credit banks. BRONTE, supra note 21, at 137.
The BOJ influences the long-term credit banks through its determination of interest rates
and its purchase of long-term credit bank bonds. Though not formally part of the Japanese
government, the Bank of Japan is influenced to a great extent by the government, which owns
55 percent of the stock of the BOJ. Moreover, through amakudari, former MOF officials work
for the Bank of Japan. Id. at 137, 142-43, 146.
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in regional areas.75 Commercial banks are governed by the Banking Law. 76
These banks receive more than 70 percent of their funds from yen depos-
its.77 Commercial banks typically make short-term loans directly to Japanese
companies.7 These short-term loans range from 60 to 180 days.' There
is an implied or express understanding between commercial banks and
Japanese companies that these loans will continue to be renewed. Japanese
companies continually renew these short-term loans and in effect use them
for long-term finance (i.e., short-term credit rolls over into long-term
credit).'s These short-term commercial bank loans to Japanese companies
frequently are applied toward such operational expenses as bills, wages, and
taxes. "
Third, the Bank of Japan, Japan's central bank, functions "as guarantor
to the commercial banks."' The Bank of Japan engages in the practice of
"overloan" by providing commercial banks with "a volume of loans larger
than would have been considered prudent by a private bank." 3 As a result
75. In addition to the Bank of Tokyo, the other city banks include Mitsubishi Bank, Sakura
Bank, Sumitomo Bank, Fuji Bank, Dai-Ichi Kangyo Bank, Sanwa Bank, Tokai Bank, Daiwa
Bank, Asahi Bank (Kyowa Bank merged with Saitama Bank to establish Kyowa Saitama Bank
on April 1, 1991, which subsequently changed its name to Asahi Bank), and Hokkaido
Takushoku Bank. Semkow, supra note 21; Graduates Take Rites of Passage into Japanese
Corporate Life, Financial Times, April 8, 1991 at 4.
The foreign banks operating in Japan, which numbered 74 in 1983, also are considered to
be commercial banks. ODA & GRICE, supra note 11, at 18. This article, however, focuses on
the city and local banks: any reference to "commercial banks" in this article is only to these two
types of commercial banks.
76. Banking Law, Law No. 59 of 1981; Semkow, supra note 21, at 100.
77. Semkow, supra note 21, at 99-100.
78. See supra note 74. Both the Ministry of Finance and the Bank of Japan influence
commercial bank lending to a great extent. The Banking Bureau of the MOF regulates most
Japanese banks, including the commercial banks and the Bank of Japan, by monitoring the funds
used by these banks. BRONTE, supra note 21, at 129. The MOF also influences the commercial
banks through anakudari: retired MOF officials work for the commercial banks. Id. at 137.
The BOJ influences the commercial banks through lending to these banks, since commercial
banks rely on loans from the BOJ. Id. at 143. In addition, the BOJ determines interest rates,
which affects the cost to the commercial banks of raising capital. The cost of raising capital is
related to bank lending activity. For example, when interest rates are low, the cost to the banks
of raising capital is low, which tends to induce lending. On the other hand, when interest rates
are high, the cost to the banks of raising capital is high, which tends to stifle lending. BALLON
& TOMITA, supra note 1, at 31.
79. Gutterman, supra note 27, at 334. Such short-term loans constitute approximately 14
percent of the financing of Japanese companies. BALLON & TOMITA, supra note 1, at 93. The
majority of the city bank loans are made to large Japanese companies whereas the majority of
the local bank loans are made to smaller Japanese companies. Id. at 87.
80. Semkow, supra note 21, at 100. Such commercial bank loans to Japanese companies
have been important in propelling Japan's economic growth, especially the rapid growth which
occurred from the 1950s to the early 1970s. Since the financial liberalization and international-
ization of the 1980s, Japanese companies have been turning to domestic and international capital
markets for long-term finance in addition to commercial bank loans. Gutterman, supra note 27,
at 334.
81. NORBURY & BOWNAS, supra note 26, at 61.
82. BALLON & TOMITA, supra note 1, at 87.
83. BRONTE, supra note 21, at 143.
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of these Bank of Japan loans, commercial banks have been able to meet the
demands of Japanese companies for funds without worrying about being
rendered insolvent.' In fact, no bank has failed in postwar Japan.,,
D. Debt Finance through Bonds
Japanese companies also can be financed with debt in the form of
domestic issues of corporate bonds.8 6 While government bonds account for
the lion's share of the total bond volume on the Tokyo Stock Exchange, the
long-term trend is towards expanding the volume of corporate bonds on the
TSE. s7
The two main types of corporate bonds are straight bonds and convert-
ible bonds. At present, straight bonds are declining in issue while convertible
bonds are increasing in issue."8 Convertible bonds can be converted into
shares of stock whereas straight bonds cannot be so converted. 9 Since
1933, the Ministry of Finance (MOF) has required issues of both convertible
and straight bonds to be secured with collateral.' As part of the financial
liberalization of the 1980s, the MOF relaxed this requirement. The Ministry
of Finance permitted 20 companies to issue unsecured straight bonds in 1983;
this number increased six-fold by 1987. 91 In addition, the MOF allowed 100
companies to issue unsecured convertible bonds in 1983. 9
Since most Japanese companies still may issue straight bonds on a
secured basis only and since these companies consider the requirement of
collateral to be a hindrance, domestic issues of straight bonds decreased
84. NORBURY & BOWNAS, supra note 26, at 61-62.
85. However, on many occasions, the Ministry of Finance has had to rescue banks which
were in trouble. BALLON & TOMITA, supra note 1, at 110.
86. In 1981, corporate bonds constituted roughly 4 percent of Japanese company financing.
Gutterman, supra note 27, at 335; BALLON & TOMITA, supra note 1, at 96.
87. The first government bond issuance in postwar Japan took place in 1966. Following the
oil shocks in the 1970s, government bond issuances increased. But since the financial
liberalization of the 1980s, overall corporate bond issuances have increased. As of 1988,
government bonds made up close to two-thirds of the total bond volume on the Tokyo Stock
Exchange. BALLON & TOMITA, supra note 1, at 96.
88. Another type of corporate bond which has been increasing in issue, bonds with equity
warrants, will not be discussed in this article because they are a very recent financial
innovation-all Japanese companies have been allowed to issue these since 1985-and because
they are similar in form and in terms of how they are regulated to convertible bonds. ODA &
GRICE, supra note 11, at 72-74.
89. COMMERCIAL CODE, 2 EHSJA art. 341.7; BALLON & TOMITA, supra note 1, at 99.
90. ODA & GRICE, supra note 11, at 72. There also are collateral requirements for short-
term loans from commercial banks and for long-term loans from long-term credit banks. BALLON
& TOMITA, supra note 1, at 199; ODA & GRICE, supra note 11, at 30-31.
91. ODA & GRICE, supra note 11, at 72; BALLON & TOMITA, supra note 1, at 99.
92. BALLON & TOMITA, supra note 1, at 99.
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sharply between the mid-1970s and the mid-1980s. 93 Meanwhile, domestic
issues of convertible bonds increased dramatically because the regulations
regarding the issuance thereof have been relaxed substantially. 94
Largely due to the increased issuance of unsecured bonds, especially
convertible bonds, overall issues of corporate bonds increased during the
1980s. 95 This increase in corporate bond issuance was related to the
financial liberalization in the 1980s in which regulations were eased to
improve the efficiency of the bond market. 96 As a result, the pace of bond
trading in Japan was brisk during the 1980s. 9
IV. EQUITY FINANCE AND THE TOKYO STOCK EXCHANGE
This section explores the equity financing of Japanese companies,
focusing on the First Section of the Tokyo Stock Exchange. 9 The Tokyo
Stock Exchange is the largest stock exchange in Japan and the second largest
stock exchange in the world in terms of total capitalization. 99 This section
discusses securities regulation in Japan, domestic stock issuance by Japanese
companies, the ownership of Tokyo Stock Exchange shares by Japanese
companies, individual investors, and foreign companies and individuals,
Japanese financial speculation and the rise and fall of Tokyo Stock Exchange
share prices during the 1980s.
A. Securities Regulation in Japan
Japan's Securities and Exchange Law (SEL), which is based on both the
U.S. Securities Exchange Act of 1933 and Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
93. ODA & GRiCE, supra note 11, at 70-72. Domestic issuance of straight bonds fell by
more than 40 percent between 1975 and 1985. BALLON & TOMITA, supra note 1, at 99.
94. Domestic issues of convertible bonds increased 771 percent between 1974 and 1985. By
1985, more than 45 percent of all convertible bonds were unsecured. Reasons for this steep
increase include companies being permitted to issue convertible bonds with the approval of the
board of directors only and not shareholders (prior to 1974, convertible bond issuance required
shareholder approval), companies being allowed to issue unsecured convertible bonds, and low
interest rates. COMMERCIAL CODE, 2 EHSJA art. 341.7; ODA & GRICE, supra note 11, at 73;
BALLON & TOMITA, supra note 1, at 99, 101.
95. Institutional investors in corporate bonds include the commercial banks, accounting for
20 percent, and other Japanese companies, accounting for roughly 7 percent, of total investment.
BALLON & TOMITA, supra note 1, at 102.
96. Id.
97. Another reason for such brisk trading was that bonds were profitable when investors
realized capital gains from selling them prior to maturity to maximize gains. Before the 1980s,
investors in Japan tended to hold their bonds until maturity. Id. at 101-02.
98. In 1980, approximately 86 percent of all domestic transactions in stock occurred on the
Tokyo Stock Exchange. BRONTE, supra note 21, at 173.
99. By 1989, the Tokyo Stock Exchange had emerged as the world's largest stock exchange.
Since the decline in TSE share prices in 1990, the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) reclaimed
its position from the Tokyo Stock Exchange as being the largest stock exchange in the world in
terms of total capitalization. See Downbeat, supra note 44; Karl Schoenberger, Tokyo Stocks
Were Due for Fall before Crisis, Analysts Say, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 27, 1990, at D1.
[Vol. 24
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was enacted in 1948 during the Allied Occupation. The SEL governs the
issuance and trading of securities on the stock exchanges in Japan, covering
among other things the registration requirements for public offerings, the
prohibition of certain types of equity securities transactions, and the operation
of the TSE. l0 '
The Securities Bureau of the Ministry of Finance is responsible for
administering the Securities and Exchange Law.1" The MOF through
administrative guidance-in the forms of directives, requests, suggestions,
and encouragements-regulates securities transactions, manages the day-to-
day operations of the stock exchanges in Japan, and devises long-term plans
for these stock exchanges. 103 Securities regulation issues-both civil and
criminal-rarely have been interpreted judicially: the Ministry of Finance has
used administrative guidance to resolve such issues so that they do not
become part of the public record."4
Moreover, the obstacles to shareholders in bringing derivative lawsuits
are many even though the Japanese Commercial Code describes the steps that
shareholders need to take in bringing derivative lawsuits on behalf of the
Japanese company against the directors." These obstacles include the lack
of a class action procedure, difficulties in the discovery of evidence, and the
high monetary costs of prosecuting a civil suit in Japan."
In sum, despite the similarities between the securities laws of the United
100. In addition, Article 65 of the Securities and Exchange Law (SEL) was based on the
U.S. Glass-Steagall Act: Article 65 completely separates the securities business from the banking
business by prohibiting banks from participating in any aspect of the securities business.
However, in reality, this separation is not as clear: for example, a bank is permitted to own up
to 5 percent of the shares in a Japanese company. Securities Exchange Law, Law No. 25 of
1948 art. 65. ODA & GRJCE, supra note 11, at 21, 80-81; BALLON & TOMITA, supra note 1, at
114. The United States supported the enactment of the Securities and Exchange Law in Japan.
The U.S. viewed the SEL as a means of helping to dissolve the zaibatsu and to democratize the
Japanese capital market. Lawrence Repeta, Declining Public Ownership of Japanese Industry:
A Case of Regulatory Failure?, 17 LAW IN JAPAN 153, 158 (1984); 5 DOING BUSINESS IN JAPAN
§ 1.02[l][a] (Zentaro Kitagawa gen. ed. 1989) [hereinafter DOING BUSINESS 1989].
101. In addition, to a lesser extent, Book I of the Japanese Commercial Code regulates
equity securities transactions. Chapter IV of Book II contains provisions for Japanese companies
such as those for the issuance of equity securities and the protection of shareholders. DOING
BUSINESS 1989, supra note 100, at § 1.02[1][a], 1.02[1][e]; COMMERCIAL CODE, 2 EHSJA.
102. Between 1948 and 1952, Japan's Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), an
independent agency modelled on that of the United States, was responsible for implementing the
Securities and Exchange Law. In 1952, the SEC in Japan was abolished and replaced by the
Finance Bureau of the Ministry of Finance. In 1964, The Securities Bureau of the MOF was
established to take over the securities regulation duties of the Finance Bureau. The Securities
Bureau is composed of six divisions-the Coordination Division, the Capital Market Division,
the Corporate Finance Division, the Trading Market Division, the Business Operations Division,
and the Inspection Division. DOING BUSINESS 1989, supra note 100, at § 1.02[4][a], 1.02[4][b].
103. Id. at § 1.02[4][b].
104. The situation in the U.S. is the complete opposite of that in Japan: the civil and
criminal court precedents of securities regulation issues are numerous. Id.
105. COMMERCIAL CODE, 2 EHSJA art. 267; Repeta, supra note 100, at 175.
106. Repeta, supra note 100, at 175.
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States and Japan, the systems of securities regulation in these countries are
different:
The American system is centered around an independent regulatory
commission that utilizes an array of judicial and other public proceedings
to implement policy and is bolstered by an active class of shareholder-
litigators that also seek enforcement of various provisions of the securities
laws through public proceedings. In Japan, the Securities Bureau of the
Ministry of Finance occupies the central position in the regulatory system.
The Bureau rarely takes any actions against specific corporations or
securities companies that become a matter of public record. Similarly,
shareholder recourse is rare.W0
B. Equity Finance through Domestic Stock Issuance
Japanese companies can raise capital through equity finance, in the form
of domestic issuance of stock. As discussed earlier, Japanese companies
traditionally have not relied on equity finance because debt finance has been
a more convenient and less expensive way to raise capital.' As a result,
Japanese companies have, on average, a debt-to-equity ratio of 2 to 1
whereas public U.S. corporations have, on average, a debt-to-equity ratio of
0.5 to 1.'9
Japanese companies can issue common or preferred stock."' Most
companies issue par value shares of common stock, which traditionally have
been issued at a price equal to the stated par value."' The par value of
shares issued upon incorporation must be at least Y50,000: most Japanese
companies listed on the TSE meet the 150,000 requirement by assigning a
Y50 par value to outstanding shares and counting 1,000 shares as one share
unit." 2 Such stock may be issued in public offerings, in offerings to
shareholders, and through private placements."' The trend in the 1980s
was towards public offerings." 4
However, when Japanese companies sought to make capital increases in
the 1980s, the companies overwhelmingly chose to issue new shares at
market price rather than at par value in offerings to existing sharehold-
107. Id. at 158-60.
108. Semkow, supra note 21, at 95; BALLON & TOMITA, supra note 1, at 89-90.
109. ABEGGLEN & STALK, supra note 66, at 150.
110. BALLON & TOMITA, supra note 1, at 105.
111. COMMERCIAL CODE, 2 EHSJA art. 202. By comparison, payment for shares of stock
with par value in U.S. corporations tends to be greater than the par value due to the free market.
112. Shares with no par value must be issued at no less than Y50,000. BALLON & TOMITA,
supra note 1, at 105.
113. Id.
114. During the early and mid-1980s, the percentage of new stock issued in public offerings
ranged between roughly 71 and 87 percent. Id.
[Vol. 24
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ers." 5 Existing shareholders have preemptive rights only when the articles
of incorporation provide for them." 6 When existing shareholders have
preemptive rights, they have the option, but not the duty, to subscribe to new
shares in proportion to their existing holdings in outstanding shares." 7
Where existing shareholders either have preemptive rights and opt out of
subscribing to new shares or do not have preemptive rights, Japanese
companies can issue new shares to other parties within the total number of
shares authorized for issue under the articles of incorporation." 8
Issuing new shares at market price rather than at par value in offerings
to existing shareholders enables Japanese companies to increase equity
capital. " 9 Market price issuance also permits Japanese companies to raise the
same amount of capital by issuing fewer shares than with par value
issuance." ° By the late 1980s, the ratio of market price shares to par value
shares was 3 to 1.121
C. Shareholding by Japanese Companies
Three main types of shareholders own the shares listed on the Tokyo
Stock Exchange-Japanese companies, individual investors, and foreign
companies and individuals. In 1987, Japanese companies owned about 70
percent, individual investors owned approximately 25 percent, and foreign
companies and individuals owned roughly 5 percent, of the shares listed on
the Tokyo Stock Exchange."2
Japanese companies own roughly 70 percent of the shares on the Tokyo
Stock Exchange due to cross-shareholding.123 Japanese companies generally
will own equal percentages of shares in each other at an equivalent market
115. Further issuance of shares at market price began in the mid-1960s. Previously, further
issues of shares had been made at par value. Id.
116. COMMERCIAL CODE, 2 EHSJA art. 280-2; 4 DOING BUSINESS IN JAPAN § 2.10[2]
(Zentaro Kitagawa ed., 1991) [hereinafter DOING BUSINESS 1991].
117. COMMERCIAL CODE, 2 EHSJA art. 280-4, 280-5; DOING BUSINESS 1991, supra note
116, at § 1.06[24], 2.10[2].
118. COMMERCIAL CODE, 2 EHSJA art. 280-5; DOING BUSINESS 1991, supra note 116 at
§ 2.10[2].
119. DOING BUSINESS 1991, supra note 116 at § 2.10[2].
120. BALLON & TOMITA, supra note 1, at 107.
121. Id.
122. The percentage of Tokyo Stock Exchange share ownership attributed to Japanese
companies includes such institutional investors as pension funds and investment trusts. Id. at
108, 113.
123. Paul Blustein, Japanese Firms Confronted By Major U.S. Shareholders, WASH. POST,
July 5, 1991, at CIO. Cross-shareholding between the companies within a particular keiretsu
contributes to this high percentage of cross-shareholding of TSE shares. For example, the
percentage of outstanding shares of each company in a keiretsu held by all the other companies
in each of the six major keiretsu ranges between roughly 20 to 30 percent. BALLON & TOMITA,
supra note 1, at 67.
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value.'" Cross-shareholding results from direct contact between officers of
both companies and from securities house (shoken gaisha) recommendations
to purchase stock in a client company."Z These recommendations primarily
come from four securities houses (with keiretsu affiliation listed in parenthe-
ses)-Nomura Securities (no affiliation), Nikko Securities (indirectly or
loosely affiliated with the Mitsubishi group), Daiwa Securities (indirectly or
loosely affiliated with the Sumitomo group), and Yamaichi Securities (no
affiliation)-which are known collectively as the "Big Four" because they
dominate the securities brokerage industry in Japan. 26
There are three important consequences of cross-shareholding. First,
cross-shareholding promotes stable shareholding, a situation in which the
shareholders of a particular company loyally accommodate the management
of this company. 7 Thus, stock ownership tends to be separated from
management in Japanese companies."n Second, stable shareholders hold
their stock indefinitely.'29 Through stable shareholding, roughly 60 percent
of TSE shares effectively are withheld from the market; only about 40
percent of TSE shares are traded. 30 Because the stock market is based on
fewer available shares, there are steeper stock price swings.'3 Third,
cross-shareholding expands the shareholding structure of both companies
since each company has a stake in the other company.3 2
One check upon cross-shareholding is the Antimonopoly Law, which
restricts a financial company (e.g., bank) from holding more than 5 percent
124. Cross-shareholding began in order to provide support for the market when the prices
of shares were deflated. BALLON & TOMITA, supra note 1, at 114.
125. Id. Since a securities brokerage firm often is referred to as a securities house (shoken
gaisha) in Japan, the latter term will be used in this article. BRONTE, supra note 21, at 77.
126. BRONTE, supra note 21, at 77-83; KESTER, supra note 22, at 291; Fat Players Face
Lean Years, FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC REvIEW, Dec. 13, 1990, at 54 [hereinafter Fat Players].
In 1990, the Big Four accounted for 74 percent of the underwriting business and 41 percent (65
percent when smaller brokers that the Big Four effectively control are included) of the securities
brokerage business in Japan. Richard Waters, Life in the Shadow of Deregulation, 4 FIN. TIMES,
Mar. 19, 1991, at IV.
127. Two aspects of shareholders loyally accommodating management deserve mention. The
first aspect is that the shareholders are not very concerned about receiving dividends on their
investment in the particular company. For example, although the average annual yield on
Japanese company shares in 1986 was slightly less than 1 percent, Japanese companies continued
to hold their shares. This is "the exact opposite of [the situation] found in American
corporations, where the main direction of management responsibility is toward shareholders and
where managers keep or lose their positions depending on how well they perform in terms of
producing a high [rate of return on investment]." The second aspect is that the shareholders tend
to vote with management at the annual general shareholder meetings and do not dispatch
representatives to observe or take part in these meetings as is done in the United States. As a
result, general shareholder meetings in Japan, most of which last for less than one hour, are
largely symbolic. Koji MATSUMOTO, THE RISE OF THE JAPANESE CORPORATE SYSTEM 5-7
(1991); Commercial Code, 2 EHSJA art. 234.
128. MATSUMOTO, supra note 128, at 5-6.
129. Ted Holden, The Tokyo Stock Exchange, BUSINESS WEEK, Feb. 12, 1990, at 74, 76.
130. Repeta, supra note 100, at 183.
131. Id.
132. BALLON & TOMITA, supra note 1, at 114.
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of the outstanding shares of another Japanese company. 33 A financial
company needs to obtain approval from the Fair Trade Commission in order
to hold more than 5 percent of such outstanding Shares.' 3 Because of this
5 percent requirement, the six largest banks in Japan own less than 5 percent
of the shares of the companies in their respective keiretsu groups. 35
Furthermore, the percentage of shareholdings that these banks own in the
other companies decreased throughout the 1980s. 36 As of March 1990, city
banks collectively held 9 percent of the shares of other companies on the
Tokyo Stock Exchange. 37
There is one notable exception to the 5 percent requirement: an
insurance company is allowed to own 10 percent of the outstanding shares
of another Japanese company. 3 However, no insurance company possesses
more than 10 percent of such shares.139 As of March 1990, Japanese life
insurance companies collectively held 13 percent of the shares of other
companies on the Tokyo Stock Exchange."4
D. Shareholding by Individual Investors
The percentage of shares owned by individual investors has decreased
since the postwar period. In 1949, when the stock exchanges in Tokyo,
Osaka, and Nagoya reopened after World War II, individual investors held
68 percent of all outstanding shares traded on these exchanges.1 41 However,
by 1985, individual investors owned only about 25 percent, whereas Japanese
companies owned roughly 75 percent, of the shares listed on the Tokyo Stock
Exchange. 142
Individual investors have lost their shareholding dominance in most
133. A 1977 amendment to the Antimonopoly Law mandated that this ceiling on the
percentage of share ownership be lowered from 10 percent to 5 percent by the end of 1987.
Antimonopoly Law art. 9; BALLON & TOMITA, supra note 1, at 114. In 1987, about 42 percent
of the shares on the Tokyo Stock Exchange were held by financial institutions. MATSUMOTO,
supra note 127, at 3.
134. BALLON & TOMITA, supra note 1, at 114.
135. KEsTER, supra note 22, at 207.
136. Id.
137. See Downbeat, supra note 44, at 15.
138. KESTER, supra note 22, at 211.
139. Id.
140. See Downbeat, supra note 44, at 15.
141. Immediately after the postwar dissolution of the zaibatsu, wide dispersed ownership
of Japanese company stock by individual investors was favored. The following three procedures
ensured wide dispersion-public tender, underwriting sales, and sales to company employees.
BISSON, supra note 3, at 26, 73-74; BALLON & TOMITA, supra note 1, at 109.
142. BALLON & TOMITA, supra note 1, at 109. Since 1975, the percentage of share
ownership by Japanese companies has increased whereas that by individual investors has
decreased. This situation differs from that in the U.S., where individual investors owned more
than 50 percent of all outstanding shares in the early 1980s. Repeta, supra note 100, at 153,
158.
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Japanese companies for many reasons. 43 First, individual investors have
bought and sold their stock more frequently than Japanese companies since
profits from selling securities are not taxed where fewer than 200,000 shares
are involved in such a transaction and fewer than 50 such transactions are
conducted per year.'" Second, since this tax exemption does not require
a certain time period of stock ownership, the short-term speculation that is
characteristic of the TSE is in effect promoted. 45 Third, individual
investors traditionally have favored more conservative investments such as
savings deposits with banks and the post office, which offer a small but fixed
rate of return on investment in the form of interest.'" Finally, Japanese
companies have consolidated their control over outstanding shares by
distributing new shares selectively (e.g., to Japanese companies that are
existing shareholders) and by cross-shareholding with other Japanese
companies. 4
E. Shareholding by Foreign Companies and Individuals
As mentioned previously, foreign companies and individuals own
approximately 5 percent of the shares on the Tokyo Stock Exchange. 48
The revised Foreign Exchange Law, which went into effect in 1980, relaxed
guidelines on foreign equity investment in Japanese companies. 49 The
restrictions which previously prohibited foreign companies from owning
more than 25 percent of all outstanding shares of most Japanese companies
and more than 15 percent of all outstanding shares of Japanese companies in
designated "strategic" industries (e.g., banking) were abolished. 50 As a
result of this relaxation, the percentage of foreign ownership of shares on the
143. Though the number of individual investors increased in the 1980s, the percentage of
individual investor ownership of shares on the Tokyo Stock Exchange decreased during that
decade. BALLON & TOMITA, supra note 1, at 109-13.
144. Id. at 109. Another reason for such frequent purchases and sales is the great pressure
that securities house salesmen exert on individual investors in order to earn commissions
therefrom. Repeta, supra note 100, at 167-69.
145. Id. at 180, 183.
146. In the short term, stock investments offer meager but constant dividends. See MATSU-
MOTO, supra note 127; BALLON & TOMITA, supra note 1, at 139. However, over the long term
(e.g., 10 years), stock investments earn capital gains which appreciate and generally are tax free.
ABEGGLEN & STALK, supra note 66, at 169-73; Repeta, supra note 100, at 180; Holden, supra
note 129.
147. BALLON & ToMITA, supra note 1, at 107, 109.
148. Foreigners initially were allowed to invest in Japanese securities in 1960. BRONTE,
supra note 21, at 181.
149. See supra notes 36, 134. The most common way that foreigners invest in shares of
Japanese companies is through the overseas offices of the Big Four securities houses. In
addition, foreign investors that deal with brokers in their home countries can purchase foreign
depository receipts which are listed on foreign stock exchanges. Depository receipts entitle
foreign investors to claims on share certificates which trustee banks in Japan hold. American
depository receipts are denominated in U.S. dollars. Bronte, supra note 21, at 182.
150. Id. at 183-84.
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TSE doubled between the mid-1970s and the mid-1980s.' 5 1
The main limitation on foreign companies under the Foreign Exchange
Law is that purchases exceeding 25 percent of all outstanding shares of
Japanese companies which "would have a major impact on the nation's
economy or security" are subject to review by the Ministry of Finance. 15 2
The primary restriction on foreign individuals under this law is that they can
own up to 10 percent of all outstanding shares of Japanese companies. 15 3
F. The Rise and Fall of Tokyo Stock Exchange Share Prices
Japanese financial speculation (zai-teku) contributed to both the increases
in Tokyo Stock Exchange share prices in the 1980s and the decreases in these
share prices and the credit contraction in 1990. During the 1980s, Tokyo
Stock Exchange share prices increased nearly five-fold because of rampant
Japanese financial speculation. 154 Investment conditions were ripe for
financial speculation: interest rates were low, and the yen was strong.' 55
The Japanese practice of financial speculation, begun by the overseas
financial subsidiaries of sogo shosha during the early 1980s, helped to
increase stock prices. 116 Japanese financial speculation specifically refers
to the practice of Japanese companies obtaining bank loans in order to
finance potentially higher-yielding investments in the stock market, especially
the Tokyo Stock Exchange. 1
57
As Tokyo Stock Exchange share prices increased in the 1980s, assets
that Japanese companies held such as land or stock in other companies
appreciated.' 58 Japanese companies borrowed more and more against these
151. In 1975, foreign companies and individuals collectively owned 2.6 percent of shares
on the TSE. In 1987, foreign companies owned about 5 percent of such shares. BALLON &
TOMITA, supra note 1, at 108, 113.
152. BRONTE, supra note 21, at 184.
153. Id.
154. Rowley, supra note 50, at 43. Tokyo Stock Exchange share prices did not fall sharply
after the October 1987 New York Stock Exchange crash. This is because the Ministry of
Finance took the following steps to prop up share prices. First, the MOF urged brokers not to
sell. Second, the MOF informed large investors of significant changes in accounting rules in
order to discourage stock sales. Finally, the MOF encouraged consumer investment in stock by
revoking the tax exemption for small savings accounts. Holden, supra note 129, at 77.
155. See Downbeat, supra note 44.
156. The Japanese term "zai-teku" literally translates as financial technology: "It is thus the
'high-tech' of making money through financial operations." BALLON & TOMITA, supra note 1,
at 141-42. It is interesting to note that foreign investors also engaged in stock market speculation
in Japan. To quote one executive with the Japanese office of a U.S. securities firm: "'Traders
of foreign firms began to pay more attention to [Japanese] speculators' buying moves and rumors
of fund raising . . . since they began to chase speculative issues-just like Japanese traders.'"
Foreigners Keep up TSE Selloff but Speculators Are on the Rise; Japanese Buying Patterns
Affecting Investor Views Abroad, Nihon Keizai Shimbun, Aug. 20, 1988, at 1.
157. BALLON & TOMITA, supra note 1, at 141-42; BURSTEIN, supra note 52, at 44.
158. Rowley, supra note 50, at 43.
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rising collateral values in order to purchase stock in other companies,
including the lending banks. '59 Moreover, Japanese banks bought and sold
stock in Japanese companies. The stock that Japanese banks held appreciated.
The banks used the increased value of this stock as collateral to lend against.
In this manner, Japanese banks were able to continue to make loans to
Japanese companies during the rising stock market. 60
Japanese financial speculation, which involved heavy bank lending,
helped to bring about the steep decline in Tokyo Stock Exchange share
prices. This decline resulted from the "lending spree which created enormous
liquidity in terms of money supply-exceeding by far the amount needed to
finance real economic activity."161 After rising to an all-time high at the
end of 1989, the Nikkei index of the Tokyo Stock Exchange dropped by 45
percent between February and October 1990.162 In addition, during the
remainder of 1990, the share issuance activity by Japanese companies was
slow. 163
When Tokyo Stock Exchange share prices fell, the value of the collateral
for existing loans was impaired. Furthermore, the banks were unable to make
further loans due to the decreased value of collateral."6 This bank lending
situation also was exacerbated by the increased cost of raising capital from
higher domestic interest rates. 65 Hence, Japanese banks were adversely
affected by the decline in Tokyo Stock Exchange share prices."
As a result, a worldwide contraction in Japanese bank credit oc-
curred. 167 In response to the credit contraction, Japanese banks began to
sell their stock in Japanese companies in order to meet Bank for International
Settlements capital adequacy standards. 6' Japanese companies also started
to sell stock which they held in Japanese banks.'69
V. CONCLUSION
Two levels of corporate interdependence in the debt and equity financing
of Japanese companies, which offer these companies certain benefits, can be
identified. The first level is the interdependence among Japanese companies
159. Id.; Auerback, supra note 51, at A18.
160. BALLON & TOMITA, supra note 1, at 141-42; BURSTEIN, supra note 52, at 44; Rowley,
supra note 50, at 43.
161. Rowley, supra note 50.
162. See Downbeat, supra note 44; Rowley, supra note 50.
163. Fat Players, supra note 126, at 55.
164. Auerback, supra note 51, at A18.
165. See supra note 56.
166. See supra note 57.
167. Baum, supra note 39; See supra note 129.
168. See supra note 59. At the end of 1990, banks still owned approximately 26 percent of
the stock of all companies listed on stock exchanges in Japan. Rowley, supra note 50, at 41.
169. Auerback, supra note 51.
24
California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 24, No. 1 [1993], Art. 4
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol24/iss1/4
1993] THE DEBT AND EQUITY FINANCING OF JAPANESE COMPANIES 79
and between these companies and the principal bank within a keiretsu. One
example of interdependence among Japanese companies that are keiretsu
members is cross-shareholding. Cross-shareholding involves reciprocal
financing: companies provide financing for and obtain financing from each
other by purchasing each other's shares. Cross-shareholding also promotes
stable shareholding, in which companies hold their shares indefinitely. In
addition, companies tend to issue new shares of stock to existing sharehold-
ers. Through cross-shareholding, the companies continue to finance each
other and are able to consolidate their control over the outstanding shares of
other companies. -
An example of the interdependence between Japanese companies and the
principal bank within a keiretsu are the principal bank loans to these
companies which they depend on to meet capital needs. The principal bank
realizes benefits from lending within a keiretsu. First, the principal bank
often has influence over the management of the companies to which the bank
makes loans. Second, by providing loans to the different companies in the
keiretsu (i.e., diversified lending), the principal bank has information about
the capital needs of these companies and can spread the risks of loan defaults
among them.
The second level of interdependence in the financing of Japanese
companies is that between the companies and the principal bank in a keiretsu
and the Japanese government. The Bank of Japan covers the principal bank
loans by lending more to these banks than a private bank would and allows
the principal bank to focus on meeting the demands of Japanese companies
for funds without worrying about being rendered insolvent. Also, the
Ministry of Finance provides funds to banks which are in financial trouble.
Hence, the Bank of Japan and the Ministry of Finance loans to banks
contribute to the financing process by insuring against business risk.
These levels illustrate the advantages of corporate interdependence in the
debt and equity financing of Japanese companies. The first level of
interdependence demonstrates how membership in a keiretsu facilitates the
financing process. Keiretsu members work together in order to meet the
capital needs of member companies. Without the keiretsu, companies would
function independently, and the financing process would become less efficient
and less certain. Independently functioning companies would need to locate
sources of finance and to work out financing arrangements with these sources
before securing financing rather than simply obtaining financing from
familiar sources.
The second level of interdependence shows how the Japanese government
facilitates the financing of Japanese companies within the keiretsu by ensuring
that the principal bank is able to meet the capital needs of member compa-
nies. Thus, the keiretsu does not operate in isolation; the keiretsu relies on
government support. Without any BOJ and MOF loans, funds would become
scarce, the principal bank would face any financial troubles alone, and
Japanese companies would not always be assured of obtaining principal bank
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loans when needed. Consequently, the financing process would be impaired.
In sum, the interdependence between Japanese companies, Japanese
banks, and the Japanese government is important in the financing of Japanese
companies. Such interdependence affords the companies advantages that they
would be unable to realize if they functioned without this. As Japanese
companies continue to realize these advantages, this corporate interdepen-
dence continues.
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